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The Cost Capture Issue in Humanitarian Mine Action
The necessity of cost capture is often overlooked in the mine action community. A
truly successful cost assessment must include clear and effective costcapture
mechanisms and even a standard structure used throughout different mine action
programs.
by Robert Keeley, Imperial College London
Introduction
One issue that has been found in the observation of mine action programs is that of
incomplete cost capture in assessing the cost of units of output. For example, not including
the cost of expatriate technical assistance in a cost benefit analysis (CBA)1 lowers the
apparent cost of demining programs and hence makes them look more costeffective than
they actually are. Similarly, it seems appropriate to include the cost of machines in cost
capture assessments—even where donated—in order to assess the true effectiveness of
their provision compared to the cost.
Failure to capture costs may also have allowed demining programs to set low prices for
services they have provided to client organisations as an extension of their core activities.2
The rationale for programs doing such work is that it generates cash for supporting their
other “humanitarian” projects and thus develops mechanisms for future sustainability.
However, if the true cost of those demining services is not captured, it may have been that
the returns were actually too low to justify this activity. It may have been more
appropriate to (a) raise prices to reflect true costs or (b) forgo the opportunity to carry out
the commercial work and concentrate on the core activities of the organisation.3 The knock
on results of inaccurate cost capture could include:
A lack of future emphasis on ensuring cost effectiveness if the project is already
seen as being “profitable.”
A reduction in the perceived need for targeting of effort on the most valuable land,
leading to a possible failure to optimise use of scarce resources.
An inability to assess the impact and costs of technical assistance if they are not
included in the cost capture process.
An inaccurate comparison with the costs of demining services provided on contract.
Aim
Clear and effective costcapture mechanisms should also assist donors in the evaluation of
different mine action programs, as they will establish a “level playing field” that will allow
the comparison of the different programs. The aim of this paper is to set out some possible
structures for a costcapture standard and consider some of the problems with its
implementation, in the hope of generating discussion on this issue.
The Elements of a Humanitarian Mine Action Program
An integrated humanitarian mine action program4 tends to consist of the following core
productive elements:
An area clearance capacity, used to search and dispose of any landmines or UXO in
an area suspected of being contaminated. The capacity tends to be divided into
different teams, which may deploy in several different locations at the same time.
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Once deployed, such teams may work on the same task site for several months until
it is cleared.
A mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity that is capable of travelling
around the countryside to deal with any items of UXO that are reported by the
public. The mobile capacity may be divided into a number of small teams capable of
responding to several tasks in one day.
A community awareness capacity capable of providing mine risk education (MRE) to
the population in and around affected areas.
Any program will also have the support elements set out in Table 1. As none of these will
directly generate any “output” they could be considered as overheads for the program.
Their cost could therefore be divided among the productive elements (see below).
Management
Planning
Database/geographic information
system (GIS)

Administration
Logistics
Training
Quality assurance

Table 1: Mine action program support elements.

Cost Capture of Productive Elements
The items in Table 2 make up the main costs incurred directly by the productive elements.
Their proportion will vary depending on the service being provided. They can also be
divided into standard definition of fixed and variable costs, with consumables and the
operation and maintenance (O+M) costs making up the variable costs.
Capital cost of equipment used by
teams (divided by expected working
life to get annual cost)
Infrastructure (accommodation,
parking, office space) rental and
utilities
Salaries of local personnel included in
teams

Other personnel costs including food
and accommodation, allowances and
insurance
Consumables
Operation and maintenance of
equipment used by teams
Share of overhead costs

Table 2: Typical mine action program costs incurred by productive elements.

This raises the need to define what comprises a “productive element.” For example,
demining teams have medics and drivers; teams may have a team leader; and teams may
be grouped together under a site manager. None of these people actually “demine”
themselves. Similar divisions of labour exist in EOD and MRE teams, and many demining
programs also have a number of regional offices that are not part of the national
headquarters. There may be many ways this could be addressed. One simple method
would be to use the divisions between “single tasking” and “multitasking” and between
“field” and “staff” as a means of allocation. For example, all personnel engaged in a single
task (i.e., members of an EOD team) are costed as personnel engaged in that task,
whereas all personnel in staff or support positions (including regional offices) are costed as
overheads.
Treatment of Survey Teams
One area where the division between “productive” and “overhead” is not immediately clear
is that of survey. There are a number of survey processes, from the impact surveys that
are analogous to surveys carried out in other development sectors, to technical surveys
that are used to determine the extent of physical contamination.5 For cost capture, it is
possible to divide them as follows:
All surveys that reduce the boundaries of suspected contamination, thus releasing
land previously regarded as mined for immediate use, should be considered as
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productive area clearance techniques.6
All techniques that are used as a means of probing mined areas to gain information
on the content of the mined areas, or to prepare the work site for subsequent
clearance, are part of the area clearance process and their cost should be attributed
accordingly.
All other surveys that are used to assess the overall impact and extent of
contamination as part of the planning process and their cost should be treated as
planning overhead.
Division of Overheads Among Productive Elements
Being able to divide overheads among the different productive elements provides the
means to establish the price of the products of the demining program. This has two other
main advantages. First, it allows services provided by the program to be compared with
similar services provided by other agencies. Second, it allows the costs of the different
services provided by the program to be compared with each other.
In order to divide overheads among the different productive elements, there is a need to
choose the unit of allocation. The four main choices are as follows:
Per team: There are too many differences between “teams” providing the same
services in different programs. For example, a mobile team in Cambodia may consist
of three personnel, whereas in Laos, a team of around eight personnel provides a
similar service. This makes it difficult to compare costs between programs.
Per unit of output: While it is necessary to establish the price of a particular
service, it is not yet possible to compare units of output (e.g., the value of a square
metre of cleared land with the value of a “unit” of MRE). This suggests that the unit
of output is not the best way to divide the cost of overheads.
Per person: This would involve a simple calculation. If a program has 100 people
engaged in demining with 10 in EOD, 10 in MRE and 20 in support, the cost of the
support would be divided among the three productive elements (i.e., in the ratio
100:10:10). While this is probably a blunt tool, it does not suffer the same
disadvantages of the two alternatives above and is perhaps a reasonable measure of
the effort being extended by the organisation. However, it does not allow for
programs that are not so personnelintensive.
Per share of budget: This shares the advantages of the “per person” above and
automatically adjusts for programs that are more or less personnel intensive. In the
same structure above, if the three components had budgets of $500K (U.S.), $200K
and $200K, the cost of overheads would be charged on the ratio of 5:2:2. This is,
therefore, the recommended option.
Expatriate Technical Assistance
In the particular case of expatriate technical assistance, failure to capture this item may
introduce bias against more mature programs that have reduced dependency on expatriate
technical assistance.
The allocation of technical assistance services could follow the same principles as used for
other overheads. In other words, the cost of technical assistance provided specifically for
the operation of EOD teams would be included in the cost of EOD teams, the cost of
technical assistance provided to operate machines would be included in the cost of area
clearance and the cost of “technical assistance” provided to maintain the organisation’s
database would be an overhead cost that would be divided among the productive
elements.
The inclusion of technical assistance in cost capture might encourage the efficient use of
such services—and the prompt removal of them when no longer necessary. There may by
a residual requirement, depending on donor practices, to maintain a limited presence over
the length of the donation in order to help ensure financial probity. This residual
requirement is akin to the “technical assistance” provided in standard development
projects and may be considered as a transaction cost of the donor and, perhaps, not
included in the program costs.
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Dealing With Multiple Accounts
In order to ensure that programs are properly costed, this process should be carried out
even where the funds are in multiple accounts that may be “ringfenced” or otherwise
inaccessible to program managers (e.g., assistance that is provided in kind to the
program). For example, if a budget of $10,000,000 did not include the cost of $1,000,000
for providing machinery, provided as an “in kind” contribution, the organisation would be
able to externalise some of the costs of mechanisation, the apparent cost would not reflect
true costs and it would give an erroneously favourable comparison with other agencies.
Other Expenditure by Donors
Other expenditures by donors that do not directly contribute to mine action programs,
such as funding conferences or campaigns, should not be attributed as donations to
specific mine action programs (though the donor may well attribute them as contributions
to “mine action” in general). This includes research and development (R&D), except where
R&D is recovered by inclusion in the market price of technology placed on the open
market. An example of this would be a donor purchasing a machine developed by a private
company on behalf of a program. As described above, the market price of the machine
should be included in the calculations as an “inkind contribution,” and it is assumed that
the manufacturer has included an element of R&D costs as part of the cost recovery
calculations set in establishing the price of the machine. There is some risk of “dumping”
technology at a lessthanmarket price (which would make the machine appear more cost
effective than it is), but this is unlikely unless the machine was not purchased on the open
market. At any rate, it may be that the donor would rather exaggerate than underestimate
a contribution.
Example
Fictional organisation consists of 850 personnel with:
52 employed in HQ*
72 employed in four regional offices*
34 employed at a training centre*
20 trainees*
600 employed in demining teams, divided into 25 teams
12 employed in four QA teams*
30 employed in 10 EOD teams
30 employed in MRE
This organisation has an annual budget of $10,000,000, divided as follows:7
Demining cost (not including overheads)

$5,500,000

EOD cost

$600,000

MRE cost

$500,000

Overheads

$3,400,000

Total

$10,000,000

Overhead costs, marked in the table above with an asterisk (*), would be allocated
according to the ratio 55:6:5.
Costs (with allocation):

Demining cost (including overheads)

$8,300,000

EOD cost

$900,000

MRE cost

$870,000

http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/7.3/notes/keeley/keeley.htm

4/6

7/21/2016

The Cost Capture Issue in Humanitarian Mine Action, by Robert Keeley (7.3)

Total

$10,000,000

If annual demining output equals 4,125,000 sq m per year.8
Therefore the apparent cost of cleared area equals $5.5 million/4.13 million sq m
equals $1.33/sq m.
Whereas true cost of cleared area equals $8.3 million/4.13 million km equals
$2.01/sq m.9
Sensitivity Analysis
The model is clearly very sensitive in absolute terms to the variations in productivity,
salaries and other costs, and it would still not be possible to carry out clumsy “apples and
oranges” comparisons of programs in different countries.10 However, variation of all such
figures still leaves a clear demonstration that proper consideration of overheads in pricing
will considerably affect the unit cost of demining.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma
The term “prisoners’ dilemma” is based on the following scenario: two prisoners are
arrested and questioned separately. If they both keep silent, they both go free. On the
other hand, if one talks, he gets a reduced sentence while the other one gets the full
punishment…and he knows his partner has the same options. What do they do?
Economists often use a model called the “prisoners’ dilemma”11 to model the risks of
compliance and noncompliance with such things as treaties regulating pollution. In this
case, it can be represented thus: Imagine two different mine action programs appealing to
a donor for funding. There is a limited amount of funding available and the donor has a
policy of supporting “cost effectiveness.” Both programs are identical in terms of socio
economic benefit they generate and are equally compliant with the international codes of
practice set out in the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). However, there are no
IMAS provisions for cost capture; thus, the programs have a choice about how they
present their costs. Their options are as follows:
Option 1: Use existing accounting processes and do not allocate overhead costs to
demining.
Option 2: Reform accounting processes and allocate overhead costs to demining.
Program A

Program B

Option 1

Option 2

Option 1

Status quo

B “wins”

Option 2

A “wins”

Better overall
understanding

Table 3: The prisoner’s dilemma of mine action cost capture.

If both programs opt for full cost capture, the demining community benefits overall;
however, if one program adopts it unilaterally, it risks appearing more expensive than the
other. The likely result of this situation is that both programs might—all other things being
equal—retain any existing accounting practices that made them appear more cost effective
if they believed that they were in competition with other demining programs. A similar
logic could have been applied to the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE).
Before there were clear standards on the requirement for PPE, programs were left with the
choice to provide or not: programs that did comply would be more expensive. However,
the introduction of a standard for PPE in IMAS has reduced the risk of this problem. There
may therefore be an argument for a similar standard for cost capture protocols for mine
action programs.
Conclusions
A cost capture process appears necessary if the strategic planning of mine action is to
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accurately measure the true costs of demining programs. This will become particularly
important when planners (and donors) attempt to measure the effectiveness of new
technologies, such as machines. Nevertheless, there appears to be little incentive for
programs to adopt such procedures unilaterally.
Standardisation is a complicated matter and an issue that is always fraught with
sensitivity. However, if there is no standard for cost capture, there is a potential risk for
programs that attempt to adopt such costcapture processes unilaterally.
Given a desire to increase real cost effectiveness and properly consider the potential
impact of dogs, machines and other new technology, there is a need to consider the
introduction of a standard of cost capture as a “best practice” for mine action programs in
order to safeguard those programs that are truly working hard to improve cost
effectiveness.
*Comments on this article would be greatly appreciated and should be directed to the author.
Endnotes
1. See examples of CBA in GICHD document “A study of SocioEconomic Approaches to Mine Action.”
The notes explain the difficulties faced by the authors in identifying all of the relevant costs.
2. For example, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) has operated a demining for cash service
for construction projects that were normally outside its mandate.
3. It is difficult to pronounce with certainty, as the accounting processes in use at the time were not
developed enough to allow such detailed analysis (based on KPMG audit of CMAC in 1999). Of
course, one cannot blame programs retrospectively for not including costcapture processes in their
accounting procedures in the past, if there was no requirement for them to do so at the time.
4. Based on a joint policy statement by three demining NGOs in 1997: Handicap International, Mines
Advisory Group and Norwegian Peoples Aid. This narrower definition does not include the wider
related activities such as antilandmine advocacy that is included in later definitions (such as those
in IMAS), which are less directly relevant to the issues covered in this paper.
5. See IMAS for the latest definitions of mine action surveys.
6. This assumes that land released by such activities is just as clear as land cleared by “clearance”
procedures.
7. Costs have been rounded for simplicity. The costs are based in generic costs in SE Asia and do not
reflect any one particular program or project.
8. Based on 25 teams working for 21 days in 11 months and each clearing 1.5 ha (150,000 sq m) per
month.
9. For the sake of simplicity, this price calculation does not include any allowance that might be made
to offset the effect of a discount rate on upfront investments. Application of a discount rate would
tend to increase both costs, with more of the additional cost being borne by the demining program
element, especially where machines are part of the upfront cost.
10. However, use of a standard costcapture mechanism would remove variables and would facilitate
accurate comparison. For example, in two otherwise identical programs, it would be easy to chart
the effect of differences in salaries if a standard costcapture mechanism were used in the
comparison.
11. For more detail, see the explanation at the following website: http://william
king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/dilemma.html.
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